It is the first scheme which allows the detection apparatus to achieve the photon number of arriving signals. Moreover, quantum bit error rates (QBERs) of multiphoton pulses can also be achieved precisely. Thus, our method is sensitive to the photon number splitting and resending (PNSR) attack, i.e., the eavesdropper (Eve) replaces one photon of the multiphoton pulse by a false one and forwards the pulse to the receiver, while the decoy-state protocols are not. In our scheme, Eve's whatever attacks will be limited by using the improved decoy-state protocols and by checking the QBERs. Based on our multiphoton pulses detection apparatus, a quasi-single-photon protocol is presented to improve the security of the communication and the rate of the final key. We analyze that our scheme is optimal under today's technology.
where n is the photon number in the multiphoton pulse in Bob's detection apparatus. In an uncharacteristic quantum channel, all e n should be identical. This can be implemented to detect Eve's PNSR attacks. As a matter of fact, Eve's some other attacks on the multiphoton pulses should also be considered or else security of the final key will be unreliable.
In this paper, we present an experimental detection apparatus which allows Bob to achieve the photon number of the multiphoton pulses. Such apparatus can also be used to obtain the QBERs e n of the multiphoton pulses precisely. Since the photon number of the arriving signal can be achieved and decoy-state protocol is implemented in our scheme, Eve's sophisticated PNS attack will be limited tightly. We show that Eve's coherent multiphoton pulse attack on the multiphoton pulses should be considered to verify the security of communication. A quasi-single-photon protocol is presented to improve the security of the communication and the rate of the final key by using our multiphoton pulses detection apparatus. Finally, we discuss and conclude that our scheme is optimal under today's technologies.
At present, practical "single-photon" sources rely on faint laser pulses in which photon number distribution obeys Possionian statistics. Most often, Alice sends to Bob a weak laser pulse in which she has encoded her bit. Each pulse is a priori in a coherent state | √ µe iθ of weak intensity. Since Eve and Bob have no information on θ, the state reduces to a mixed state ρ = dθ 2π | √ µe iθ √ µe iθ | outside Alice's laboratory. This state is equivalent to the mixture of Fock state n p n |n n|, with the number n of photons distributed as Possionian statistics p n = P µ (n) = µ n e −µ /n!. The source that emits pulses in coherent states | √ µe iθ is equivalent to the representation as below: With probability p 0 , Alice does nothing; With probability p n (n > 0), Alice encodes her bit in n photons. Thus, Eve can use two different eavesdropping strategies to gain information about Alice's qubit. Eve first performs a nondemolition measurement to gain the photon number of the laser pulses. When she finds there is only one photon in the pulses, she implements symmetric individual (SI) attacks to gain Alice's information [7] . Otherwise, if there are two or more than two photons in the pulses, she will perform some multiphoton attacks on Alice's qubit, e.g., she may implement PNS attack on Alice's qubit. The probability of that a nonempty pulse contains more than one photon is that
It is a fact that the probability of p(n > 1|n > 0, µ) can be made arbitrary small so that weak pulses are practical and have indeed been used in the vast majority of experiments [1] . However, in long distance QKD, the channel transmittance η [8] can be rather small. If η < (1 − e −µ − µe −µ )/µ, Eve can gain full information of Bob's final key by using the PNS attack.
P hoton − number measurement and QBERs of multiphoton pulses. -In the PNS attack scheme, Eve first performs a nondemolition photon-number measurement. She selectively intercepts one photon in the multiphoton pulses and draws information after Alice and Bob reveal the basis. Recently, several decoy-state protocols have been presented to beat Eve's PNS attack [4] [5] [6] . In such decoy-state protocols, Alice intentionally and randomly replaces photon pulses from signal sources by multiphoton pulses (the decoy pulses). Suppose Eve can not distinguish pulses of signal source from those of decoy source. Without the presence of Eve, the yield [4] of two pulses should be similar. Therefore, Alice and Bob can detect the PNS attack by checking the yield of decoy source. However, Eve may use PNSR attack to avoid Alice's decoy-state detection. After intercepting one photon in the multiphoton pulses, she adds a false photon to the pulse and forwards the pulse to Bob. In this case, the yield of multiphoton is normal and the decoy-state protocol becomes insensitive. Naturally, Eve's PNSR attack would cause some additional QBERs. This requires Bob's detection apparatus is sensitive to QBERs of the multiphoton pulses.
In Fig. 1 , we present a method to obtain the photon number of the multiphoton pulses. Furthermore, QBERs of different multiphoton pulses can also be achieved. In Fig. 1(A) , there are N beam splitters (BSs) at the end of the fiber. The probability that two photons were detected in one single-photon detector is approximate to O(1/N ) [10] . Bob can perfectly achieve the photon number of the multiphoton pulses by increasing the number of the BS. In Fig.  1 (B), there is a polarization beam splitter (PBS) at each output of each BS. Obviously, these PBSs should be parallel. Using Alice's public announcement, Bob can obtain QBERs with his statistic data. Moreover, Bob can achieve the different QBERs of different multiphoton pulses, which can help him to find out Eve's PNSR attack. Thus, if either the photon number statistics results or the QBER is abnormal, Alice and Bob will know that Eve is in line.
T he improved decoy − state protocol and verif ying the presence of Eve. -In order to detect Eve's PNS and PNSR-like attacks on the multiphoton pulses, Alice and Bob will use the improved decoy-state protocol to verify the security of their communication. Suppose Alice and Bob select µ as signal source and µ ′ as the decoy source in our scheme. Essentially, the idea of decoy-state is that [6]
where Y n is the yield [4,9] of the of an n-photon signal and e n is the bit error rate of the n-photon signal described above. Without Eve's presence, the photon number distribution is also Poissonian with the channel transmittance η,
In general, let us suppose that Eve has a lossless quantum channel, i.e, η = 1. She implements PNS attack on the photon pulses with probability P Eve (n). The necessary and sufficient condition that Eve can redistribute the photon number without being detected is that
is satisfied for all n. Here P Eve (n) is the same for both signal pulses and decoy pulses because Eve can not distinguish them. A simple analysis shows that such P Eve (n) do not exist because one P Eve (n) has to satisfies two independent equations. Therefore, Eve's any PNS attack will be detected theoretically. . Another question is that Eve may use PNSR attack on the multiphoton pulses. In this way, Eve can also achieve full information of Alice's qubit. Without doubt, Eve's PNSR attack would cause some additional bit error rate of the multiphoton pulses. Fortunately, our scheme is sensitive to the bit error rate of multiphoton pulses e n [12] .
The photon number statistics P µ loss (n), P µ ′ loss (n) and e n can be verified experimentally, so that Eve's any attempt to change them significantly will almost be caught. Thus, all Eve's eavesdropping attacks should be hidden in the errors of photon number statistics and in the QBER. Since our scheme is sensitive to the photon number and QBERs of multiphoton pulses, we call our decoy-state scheme an improved decoy-state protocol.
Eve ′ s optimal eavesdropping scheme. -In a general way, we will assume that Eve's ability is only limited by the principles of quantum mechanics. It is allowable that Eve holds a lossless channel and a perfect quantum memory. Therefore, Eve can get benefits from noises and channel losses. In order to avoid being detected, Eve will hide all of her attacks in the QBER or in the photon number statistics errors. Therefore, the optimal eavesdropping scheme Eve may use can be described as follow. Eve implements SI attack on the single photon pulses. She uses the PNS attack on the multiphoton pulses with an optimal probability and performs coherent multiphoton pulse (CMP) attack on the other multiphoton pulses. In this case, the maximal information Eve can gain is bounded by
As it was discussed above, information Eve can gain by using PNS attack should be lower than
µ ′ e −µ ′ . The probability that all signals are detected is that p D = η(µ + O(µ 2 )). The probability that the sources emits more than one photon
. So the probability Eve use a CMP attack is that
The probability that Eve uses a SI attack is that p SI = 1 − p CMP − p P N S [13] . In this way, Eve can attack on the communication optimally without being detected, i.e., I
AE is the theoretical limitation to Eve's information. Coherent multiphoton pulses attack. -Since Eve's superfluous PNS attack would be detected in a decoy-state protocol, she has to use some other multiphoton pulse attack scheme to eavesdrop Alice's information as possible as she can. However, the abnormal QBERs of multiphoton pulses could be detected. So, all her attacks should be hidden in noises. Using the detection apparatus we have presented above, Alice and Bob can obtain different QBERs of different multiphoton pulses. In the practical quantum channel, all QBERs of different pulses should be identical. So, we consider that the optimal and practical attack scheme Eve may use is CMP attack.
In CMP attack, Eve attaches independent probes to each photon in a multiphoton pulse and measures all probes coherently. It can be proven that a CMP attack is equivalent to that Eve performs SI attacks on each photon in the pulse respectively [14] . The maximal probability that Eve correctly guess Alice's qubit by using optimal SI attack is [1 + sin(x)]/2 with the QBER=[1 − cos(x)]/2 [15] . Thus, the probability of that Eve can correctly guesses Alice's qubit by using CMP attack is that 1 − [
] n , where n is the photon number of the pulses. In practice, n is approximate to 2. Consequently, one can obtain
where h(x) = −x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) and e is QBER. Secure f inal key. -The final key is secure if and only if I AB > I AE . In fact, I AB is determined by the unique variable QBER since I AB = 1 − h (e). The maximal information Eve can gain by using SI attack is given by
[16]. Consequently, security of the final key is determined by the parameter µ, µ ′ , and e.
Since µ and µ ′ are invariable in an experiment, security of the final key is uniquely determined by the parameter e. The variable e increases as long as the distance l between Alice and Bob increases. Consequently, security of the final key is actually determined by the variable l in an experiment. A typical QKD experiment is that µ = 0.1, l = 120km, and QBER = 5%. If the decoy-state scheme was used in such experiment with the parameter µ ′ = 1.0, the final key is still secure (See Fig. 2.) .
Quasi-single-photon QKD protocol. -From the discussion above, we know that Eve can get more benefits from a multiphoton pulse than a single-photon pulse. If Alice and Bob can discard some of the multiphoton pulses, security of the communication will be enhanced. It seems impossible that Alice can distinguish the single-photon pulses from the multiphoton pulses today. However, Bob can find out which pulses are multiphoton he received by using the detection apparatus we have presented. Bob labels such multiphoton pulses and drops them out of their raw key. Since Alice and Bob only use those pulses which are verified by Bob as single-photon pulses to generate their sifted key, we call such protocol quasi-single-photon QKD protocol.
The probability that Bob detects a multiphoton pulse is ǫ ⋍ µ 2 η 2 / p D ≈ η/2. In BB84, one can establish an asymptotically achievable rate of secure final key from sifted key [2] 
That is, in BB84 protocol, a fraction h (e) of the sifted key bits are sacrificed asymptotically to perform error correction by using CSS code [17] . The fraction h (t) of the sifted key bits are sacrificed to perform privacy amplification. The final key rate can be improved if h (t) was reduced. Since Eve can get more benefits from the multiphoton pulses, both the security of the communication and the final key rate will be improved if some of the multiphoton pulses are discarded. Discussion and conclusion. -Today, quantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telcom fibers has been successfully performed. The crucial issue in QKD is its security. Experimentally, the source is imperfect and the channel is lossy and noisy. In our experimental scheme, QBERs of different photon pulses can be achieved precisely. Thus, the additional and abnormal QBER caused by Eve will be detected. Our detection apparatus can distinguish the photon number of an arriving signal precisely so that the precision of the decoy-state protocol can be improved to detect Eve's PNS attack. At present, it seems impossible that Alice can distinguish multiphoton pulses from single-photon pulses, so that it is an advancement that Bob can distinguish the multiphoton pulses and discard them. Therefore, our experimental scheme is optimal for practical BB84 protocol under today's technology.
In summary, we have discussed the security of practical BB84 QKD protocol with weak coherent sources, noises and high losses. We have presented a detection apparatus to resolve the photon number of arriving signals. QBERs of the different photon pulses can also be achieved in our scheme. Eve's sophisticated PNS attack can be detected by using the improved decoy-state protocol in our scheme. We have presented a quasi-single-photon QKD protocol to improve the security of the communication protocol and the rate of secure final key. We have discussed that our experimental scheme is optimal under today's technology.
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